Provision of information - Revision history

imported>Doug Williamson: Classify page.

2022-07-02T07:35:35Z

Classify page.

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:35, 2 July 2022
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	A provision of information covenant requires the borrower to provide information to enable the lender to monitor the borrower’s credit risk.		A provision of information covenant requires the borrower to provide information to enable the lender to monitor the borrower’s credit risk.

	Such information routinely includes copies of published financial information and circulars to shareholders~~. It is unlikely that treasurers will see any problem with this~~.		Such information routinely includes copies of published financial information and circulars to shareholders.

			It is unlikely that treasurers will see any problem with this.

	Ideally from a corporate borrower's perspective, the borrower would only provide published information, but weaker credits are unlikely to be able to negotiate this. Generally the level of information required increases as the credit quality of the borrower falls, and can include budgets, forecasts and management accounts.

	~~Problems may arise when~~ the borrower ~~is a quoted company and the~~ information ~~sought is unpublished and therefore possibly price sensitive~~, ~~especially if the lender is a universal bank conducting both lending and share dealing activities. Even though most banks will have internal 'Chinese walls' (barriers designed~~ to ~~prevent transfer of confidential information between departments), treasurers may wish~~ to ~~obtain additional confidentiality undertakings bearing in mind regulatory requirements imposing a ‘continuing obligation’ of the avoidance of a false market~~.		Ideally from a corporate borrower's perspective, the borrower would only provide published information, but weaker credits are unlikely to be able to negotiate this.

			Generally the level of information required increases as the credit quality of the borrower falls, and can include budgets, forecasts and management accounts.

	Where non-bank lenders are involved in bank type lending arrangements, this issue of confidentiality becomes more extreme. While banks have established procedures for keeping information separate from different areas, non-banks do not have this sophistication. One solution is to restrict information to certain lenders to only published data and indeed some presentations are managed in two parts to deal with this.
			Problems may arise when the borrower is a quoted company and the information sought is unpublished and therefore possibly price sensitive, especially if the lender is a universal bank conducting both lending and share dealing activities.

			Even though most banks will have internal 'Chinese walls' (barriers designed to prevent transfer of confidential information between departments), treasurers may wish to obtain additional confidentiality undertakings bearing in mind regulatory requirements imposing a ‘continuing obligation’ of the avoidance of a false market.


			Where non-bank lenders are involved in bank type lending arrangements, this issue of confidentiality becomes more extreme.

			While banks have established procedures for keeping information separate from different areas, non-banks do not have this sophistication.

			One solution is to restrict information to certain lenders to only published data and indeed some presentations are managed in two parts to deal with this.


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	* [[Negative pledge]]		* [[Negative pledge]]
	* [[Non-financial covenant]]		* [[Non-financial covenant]]

			[[Category:The_business_context]]
			[[Category:Corporate_finance]]
			[[Category:Financial_products_and_markets]]

imported>Doug Williamson: Link with Confidential information.

2017-06-22T10:42:12Z

Link with Confidential information.

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:42, 22 June 2017
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	== See also ==		== See also ==
	* [[Covenant]]		* [[Covenant]]
			* [[Confidential information]]
	* [[Financial covenant]]		* [[Financial covenant]]
	* [[Negative pledge]]		* [[Negative pledge]]
	* [[Non-financial covenant]]		* [[Non-financial covenant]]

imported>Doug Williamson: Added internal explanation of Chinese walls

2015-08-01T15:40:16Z

Added internal explanation of Chinese walls

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:40, 1 August 2015
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	Ideally from a corporate borrower's perspective, the borrower would only provide published information, but weaker credits are unlikely to be able to negotiate this. Generally the level of information required increases as the credit quality of the borrower falls, and can include budgets, forecasts and management accounts.		Ideally from a corporate borrower's perspective, the borrower would only provide published information, but weaker credits are unlikely to be able to negotiate this. Generally the level of information required increases as the credit quality of the borrower falls, and can include budgets, forecasts and management accounts.

	Problems may arise when the borrower is a quoted company and the information sought is unpublished and therefore possibly price sensitive, especially if the lender is a universal bank conducting both lending and share dealing activities. Even though most banks will have internal information ~~barriers (Chinese Walls~~), treasurers may wish to obtain additional confidentiality undertakings bearing in mind regulatory requirements imposing a ‘continuing obligation’ of the avoidance of a false market.		Problems may arise when the borrower is a quoted company and the information sought is unpublished and therefore possibly price sensitive, especially if the lender is a universal bank conducting both lending and share dealing activities. Even though most banks will have internal 'Chinese walls' (barriers designed to prevent transfer of confidential information between departments), treasurers may wish to obtain additional confidentiality undertakings bearing in mind regulatory requirements imposing a ‘continuing obligation’ of the avoidance of a false market.


	Where non-bank lenders are involved in bank type lending arrangements, this issue of confidentiality becomes more extreme. While banks have established procedures for keeping information separate from different areas, non-banks do not have this sophistication. One solution is to restrict information to certain lenders to only published data and indeed some presentations are managed in two parts to deal with this.		Where non-bank lenders are involved in bank type lending arrangements, this issue of confidentiality becomes more extreme. While banks have established procedures for keeping information separate from different areas, non-banks do not have this sophistication. One solution is to restrict information to certain lenders to only published data and indeed some presentations are managed in two parts to deal with this.


	== See also ==		== See also ==

imported>Doug Williamson: Added missing 'to' in first line and explanation of Chinese Walls

2015-07-29T09:48:25Z

Added missing 'to' in first line and explanation of Chinese Walls

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:48, 29 July 2015
Line 1:		Line 1:
	A provision of information covenant requires the borrower to provide information enable the lender to monitor the borrower’s credit risk.		A provision of information covenant requires the borrower to provide information to enable the lender to monitor the borrower’s credit risk.

	Such information routinely includes copies of published financial information and circulars to shareholders. It is unlikely that treasurers will see any problem with this.		Such information routinely includes copies of published financial information and circulars to shareholders. It is unlikely that treasurers will see any problem with this.
Line 6:		Line 6:
	Ideally from a corporate borrower's perspective, the borrower would only provide published information, but weaker credits are unlikely to be able to negotiate this. Generally the level of information required increases as the credit quality of the borrower falls, and can include budgets, forecasts and management accounts.		Ideally from a corporate borrower's perspective, the borrower would only provide published information, but weaker credits are unlikely to be able to negotiate this. Generally the level of information required increases as the credit quality of the borrower falls, and can include budgets, forecasts and management accounts.

	Problems may arise when the borrower is a quoted company and the information sought is unpublished and therefore possibly price sensitive, especially if the lender is a universal bank conducting both lending and share dealing activities. Even though most banks will have internal Chinese Walls, treasurers may wish to obtain additional confidentiality undertakings bearing in mind regulatory requirements imposing a ‘continuing obligation’ of the avoidance of a false market.		Problems may arise when the borrower is a quoted company and the information sought is unpublished and therefore possibly price sensitive, especially if the lender is a universal bank conducting both lending and share dealing activities. Even though most banks will have internal information barriers (Chinese Walls), treasurers may wish to obtain additional confidentiality undertakings bearing in mind regulatory requirements imposing a ‘continuing obligation’ of the avoidance of a false market.

imported>Doug Williamson: Created page with "A provision of information covenant requires the borrower to provide information enable the lender to monitor the borrower’s credit risk. Such information routinely includ..."

2015-07-20T13:49:21Z

Created page with "A provision of information covenant requires the borrower to provide information enable the lender to monitor the borrower’s credit risk. Such information routinely includ..."

New page

A provision of information covenant requires the borrower to provide information enable the lender to monitor the borrower’s credit risk.

Such information routinely includes copies of published financial information and circulars to shareholders. It is unlikely that treasurers will see any problem with this.

Ideally from a corporate borrower's perspective, the borrower would only provide published information, but weaker credits are unlikely to be able to negotiate this. Generally the level of information required increases as the credit quality of the borrower falls, and can include budgets, forecasts and management accounts.

Problems may arise when the borrower is a quoted company and the information sought is unpublished and therefore possibly price sensitive, especially if the lender is a universal bank conducting both lending and share dealing activities. Even though most banks will have internal Chinese Walls, treasurers may wish to obtain additional confidentiality undertakings bearing in mind regulatory requirements imposing a ‘continuing obligation’ of the avoidance of a false market.

Where non-bank lenders are involved in bank type lending arrangements, this issue of confidentiality becomes more extreme. While banks have established procedures for keeping information separate from different areas, non-banks do not have this sophistication. One solution is to restrict information to certain lenders to only published data and indeed some presentations are managed in two parts to deal with this.

== See also ==
* [[Covenant]]
* [[Financial covenant]]
* [[Negative pledge]]
* [[Non-financial covenant]]